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S-1 
THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF 
NEUROSCIENCE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL 
LITIGATION 
JAMIE WAGENHEIM* 
Neuroscience has the potential to significantly impact civil and criminal 
litigation.1 Attorneys have successfully used neuroscience evidence to demonstrate 
that a client had an inability to form the requisite intent for a particular crime,2 that 
a child‘s violence resulted from his experiences playing graphic video games,3 and 
that brain deficiencies vitiated an assailant‘s self control.4 Not all state and federal 
courts readily accept neuroscience evidence, instead applying their respective state 
and federal rules of evidence on the admissibility of expert testimony with varying 
degrees of stringency.5 Even states applying identical evidentiary standards have 
taken different approaches to the admissibility of neuroscience evidence.6 For 
neuroscience evidence to reach its full potential, the state and federal courts must 
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 1.  See Joshua Greene & Jonathon Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and 
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC.1775, 1775 (2004) (―[N]euroscience will challenge 
and ultimately reshape our intuitive sense(s) of justice. New neuroscience will affect the way we view 
the law . . . .‖).  
 2.  See New York v. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (using neuroscience to 
argue that a brain defect prevented a husband from forming the requisite intent to strangle his wife and 
throw her out of a window twelve stories above the ground). 
 3.  Entertainment Software Ass'. v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059 (N.D. Ill. 2005) 
(arguing that graphic video games cause children to behave aggressively). 
 4.  See Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 11, 2007, at 49 (describing 
the popularity of Daniel Martell‘s litigation consulting business, Forensic Neuroscience, where he has 
testified in hundreds of civil and criminal cases on neuroscience issues, including the use of brain scans 
to argue that a neurological impairment prevented litigants from exercising self-control). 
 5.  See Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶ 26 (2009), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/jones-brain-imaging.pdf (noting that 
scientific evidence standards differ between states).  
 6.  See infra Part II. 
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apply evidentiary rules uniformly in order to establish a consistent, predictable 
standard.  
Part I of this paper will discuss the Federal Rules of Evidence on expert 
testimony and the revolutionary Supreme Court case that redefined the Federal 
Rules, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.7 Part II will examine Quick v. 
State8 and U.S. v. Scott,9 two recent criminal cases from two different courts 
applying the Daubert standard. Each court applied the evidentiary rules differently 
in determining whether to admit neuroscience evidence that supported similar 
exculpatory arguments regarding the requisite intent to commit murder and assault, 
respectively.10 Finally, Part III will analyze the Daubert ruling‘s effect on the 
admissibility of scientific evidence and reasons for the variation in the treatment of 
similar neuroscience testimony in different courts applying comparable evidentiary 
standards, particularly in the recent context of the Quick and Scott rulings. 
I.  THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ON EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Expert testimony has faced criticism since at least the nineteenth century.11 
Judge Learned Hand, discontent with the increasing frequency of  highly 
credentialed experts offering completely polarized opinions on the stand, 
questioned, ―[H]ow can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon 
an experience admittedly foreign in kind to their own?‖12 
Fifty years prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals established the first uniform federal standard 
for the admissibility of expert testimony in Frye v. United States.13 In Frye, the 
Court excluded testimony regarding a new systolic blood pressure test designed to 
detect falsehood because the expert testimony attempted to prematurely introduce 
an underdeveloped principle.14 The Court then established what became known as 
the ―Frye rule‖ in holding that ―while courts will go a long way in admitting expert 
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the 
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.‖15 Courts 
 
 7.  509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 8.  No. 01-09-01127-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680 (Tex. App. Jan. 27, 2011).  
 9.  No. CR-09-0131-EFS, 2011 WL 1327033 (E.D. Wash. April 7, 2011). 
 10.  See infra Part II. 
 11.  Lee Loevinger, Science as Evidence, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 154 (1994). 
 12.  Learned Hand, Expert Testimony, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding, 15 
HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1902).  
 13.  293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).   
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
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followed Frye, even after the enactment of the Federal Rules, until the Court 
clarified that the Federal Rules supersede Frye.16 
Rules 702 through 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence govern expert 
testimony.17 Rule 702 concerns Testimony by Experts generally and provides that: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert‘s scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based 
on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of 
reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.18 
Rule 704 governs Opinion on Ultimate Issue, which becomes relevant in 
criminal cases such as Quick and Scott when experts seek to testify as to a 
defendant‘s requisite intent to commit a particular crime.19 Rule 704 provides,‖[i]n 
a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the 
defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element 
of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.‖20  
The Federal Rules still require that the judge ultimately decides whether or 
not to admit the expert testimony, a role described as gatekeeping.21 State courts 
have their own rules of evidence, but many states have attempted to correlate their 
rules with the federal rules both linguistically and numerically.22 
In 1993, the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Daubert completely restructured how 
courts approached the admissibility of expert testimony.23 In Daubert, the Court 
delineated five factors for courts to consider in admitting expert testimony:  
(1) whether the expert‘s technique or theory can be or has been tested 
- that is, whether the expert‘s theory can be challenged in some 
objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, 
 
 16.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993) (―[T]he Frye rule did not 
survive the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.‖). Prior to the Court‘s ruling in Daubert, the 
courts highly regarded Frye as the governing standard, with nearly 1000 cases between 1930 and 1993 
directly citing the Frye rule. See Loevinger, supra note 11, at 157 n. 19. 
 17.  FED. R. EVID. 702–706. 
 18.  Id. at 702. 
 19.  Id. at 704(b). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee‘s note. 
 22.  Tennessee, Texas, and Maryland are examples of states that have all adopted evidentiary rules 
on expert testimony that mirror the Federal Rules. See, e.g., TENN. R. EVID. 7.02 (―Testimony By 
Experts‖); TEX. R. EVID. 702 (―Testimony By Experts‖); MD. R. 5-702 (―Testimony By Experts‖). 
 23.  See Heather G. Hamilton, Note, The Movement From Frye to Daubert: Where Do The States 
Stand, 38 JURIMETRICS 201, 206 (1998) (describing Daubert as the ―coup de grace for those courts 
seeking specific persuasive authority to discard Frye altogether‖).  
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conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for 
reliability; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to 
peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error 
of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and 
maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the technique 
or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community.24 
Reflecting the multiplicity of advancements in the realm of science and 
technology since the D.C. Court‘s 1923 ruling in Frye, the Supreme Court‘s 
revolutionary ruling in Daubert catered to the joint needs of the scientific and legal 
communities.25  
While more than just the Frye and Daubert standards exist for admitting 
expert testimony, state courts are generally divided over whether to follow Frye or 
Daubert.26 Lawyers seeking to admit neuroscience evidence must navigate through 
the federal rules and the varying state standards when attempting to introduce 
expert witness testimony at trial.27 
II.  RECENT ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE NEUROSCIENCE EXPERT TESTIMONY 
With the increasingly frequent use of neuroscience evidence in trial,28 lawyers 
must analyze the evidentiary standards of the respective federal or state court trying 
their case. This part will examine two recent cases in which counsel sought to 
introduce neuroscience evidence in mitigation of their client‘s intent to commit 
murder and assault, respectively, and the court‘s subsequent admission or denial of 
that evidence. Part A will discuss the 2011 Texas case Quick v. State, in which the 
Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision to exclude 
neuropsychological evidence on the accused‘s inability to form the requisite intent 
for a murder conviction.29 Part B will discuss the 2011 federal district court case 
 
 24.  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee‘s note (referencing Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). 
 25.  See Loevinger, supra note 11, at 158–59 (observing that at the time of the Frye ruling, 12,000 
people answering the 1920 U.S. Census described themselves as a ―science, technical, or kindred 
worker,‖ while this number jumped to 2.6 million by the 1990 census).  
 26.  Hamilton, supra note 23, at 201. Two other recent Supreme Court cases have also had a major 
impact on evidence admissibility: General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) and Kumho Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). See David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, 
and Future of the General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS 385, 386 (2001) (describing Daubert, 
Joiner, and Kumho together as ―[t]he Supreme Court‘s expert evidence trilogy‖). While Joiner and 
Kumho have played an important role in refining the standards for expert admissibility, analysts have 
typically bifurcated the standards for expert testimony into the Frye and Daubert camps, grouping 
Joiner and Kumho into one standard, sometimes labeled as ―Daubert and its progeny.‖ Id.  
 27.  See Jones et al., supra note 5, ¶26 (noting the different scientific evidentiary standards across 
jurisdictions). 
 28.  See Jones et al., supra note 5, ¶1 (―It has become increasingly common for brain images to be 
proffered as evidence in civil and criminal litigation.‖).   
 29.  Quick v. State, No. 01-09-01127-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680 (Tex. App. Jan. 27, 2011).  
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U.S. v. Scott, in which the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Washington admitted testimony from two experts who argued that the defendant 
became temporarily insane due to involuntary intoxication as a defense to his 
accused crime of assaulting two federal employees.30 
A.  The Texas Approach to Neuropsychological Evidence 
 1.  The Relevant Texas Evidentiary and Statutory Standards 
Texas Rules of Evidence 702 through 704 govern the admissibility of expert 
testimony.31 Rule 702 provides, ―[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.‖32 
Texas Rule 704 (Opinion on Ultimate Issue) is identical to the Federal Rule, but 
omits Part B of the Federal Rule, which prohibits an expert from testifying as to 
whether a defendant possessed the requisite mental state for his alleged crime.33 In 
Quick v. State, the defendant‘s chief defense relied on his experts‘ opinions as to 
whether the defendant possessed the requisite mental state for his alleged crime.34 
Texas follows the Daubert rule for the admissibility of expert scientific 
testimony, as well as the similar reasoning from the 1992 Texas Criminal Court of 
Appeals case Kelly v. State.35 In following Daubert and Kelly, the Supreme Court 
of Texas added supplemental factors to its codified Rule 702 on the admissibility of 
expert testimony.36 The Supreme Court of Texas mandated that the proffered 
evidence relate to the case at bar, and that the scientific testimony has foundation in 
reliable scientific theory.37 The Court listed all of the factors delineated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Daubert for future Texas courts to consider when 
 
 30.  U.S. v. Scott, No. CR-09-0131-EFS, 2011 WL 1327033 (E.D. Wash. April 7, 2011). 
 31.  See TEX. R. EVID. 702–704. 
 32.  TEX. R. EVID. 702. The Texas rule is identical—verbatim—to the federal rule, with the 
exception that the Texas rule omits the three qualifying factors for admissibility included in the federal 
rule. See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 33.  Compare TEX. R. EVID. 704, with FED. R. EVID. 704. Part B of the Federal Rule, which the 
Texas rule omits, states ―[i]n a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether 
the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime 
charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.‖ Id.  
 34.  See Quick v. State, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, *13–14 (Tex. App. 2011) (affirming the trial 
court‘s decision to exclude the appellant‘s experts, who had proffered testimony that appellant‘s actions 
were only reckless and failed to meet the requisite mental state to convict him of murder). 
 35.  824 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Kelly delineates seven factors for the 
admissibility of expert testimony that generally incorporate the factors listed in Daubert. Id. at 573. In 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, the Supreme Court of Texas held: ―We are persuaded by 
the reasoning in Daubert and Kelly.‖ 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995). 
 36.  E.I. du Pont, 923 S.W.2d at 557. 
 37.  E.I. du Pont, 923 S.W. 2d at at 556.   
WAGENHEIM.APPENDIX  
S-6 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 15:Supp. 
evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony, and emphasized that courts are not 
limited to the Daubert factors.38 
Contrary to the Federal Rules, Texas allows a defendant to offer expert 
testimony regarding his mental state in order to mitigate his conviction from 
murder to manslaughter.39 Although not included in Texas Rule of Evidence 704, 
Texas case law allows a defendant to offer evidence of his mental state at the time 
of the alleged crime in order to refute the requisite mental state for his accused 
crime.40 The expert testimony proffered in Quick sought to prove the defendant‘s 
diminished executive functioning in his brain prevented him from forming the 
requisite mental state for murder.41 To meet the requisite mental state for murder, 
the accused must have the requisite mental state to ―intentionally or knowingly 
[cause] the death of an individual‖ and to ―intend[] to cause serious bodily injury 
and commit[] an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an 
individual.‖42 In Quick, the defendant argued that his impaired executive 
functioning prevented him from forming the requisite mental state at the time of his 
alleged murder offense.43  
 2.  Treatment of Expert Neuroscience Testimony in Quick 
A Texas jury convicted James Irvin Quick of the murder of Michelle Denise 
Mellton.44 Quick admitted to the murder in a videotaped custodial statement with 
detectives.45 The jury found Quick guilty of murder and the trial court sentenced 
him to fifteen years in prison.46 Quick appealed, alleging that the trial court abused 
its discretion by allowing the State to mention his failure to testify at trial during 
the prosecution‘s closing argument and by barring Quick‘s three psychological and 
psychiatric experts from testifying regarding his ability to form the requisite intent 
to commit murder.47 The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and the 
trial court‘s denial of his neuroscience experts.48 
 
 38.  See id. at 557 (describing the Daubert factors as ―non-exclusive‖).   
 39.  Compare FED. R. EVID. 704, with TEX. R. EVID. 704. See Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at 
*9 (describing the Texas courts‘ approach to admitting relevant evidence to negate a defendant‘s 
requisite mens rea, including a defendant‘s mental health history) (citing Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 
568, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Although Texas Rule of Evidence 704 has omitted the portion of 
Federal Rule 704 regarding an expert‘s ability to opine on a defendant‘s requisite mental state, Jackson 
allows such evidence on mental state. Id.  
 40. See Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 573–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (allowing evidence of a 
defendant‘s mental health to negate the requisite mens rea).  
 41.  Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *6–*7.  
 42.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1)–(2). 
 43.  Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *6–*7. 
 44.  Id. at *1–*3. 
 45.  Id. at *2.  
 46.  Id. at *3. 
 47.  Id. at *1, *6. 
 48.  Id. at *1. 
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On the expert testimony issue, Quick contended that he could not form the 
requisite intent for murder due to impaired executive functioning in his brain.49 The 
overwhelming evidence against him—including his own confession—precluded 
any protestations of innocence.50 Instead, Quick claimed that the testimony of his 
psychological and psychiatric experts, if believed by the jury, could have led him to 
receive a lesser sentence for manslaughter rather than the harsher sentence for 
murder.51 
Prior to deciding whether to admit the testimony of the three experts proffered 
by Quick, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of 
the experts‘ testimony.52 Quick sought to present all three experts to testify on his 
diminished executive functioning and the relationship between his neurological 
impairment and his inability to form the requisite intent for murder.53 Through the 
experts, Quick sought to prove that he acted recklessly, which requires a lesser 
mental capacity than a murder conviction requires under the Texas penal code.54 
During the hearing, Quick‘s attorney explained that if the Court admitted the 
experts‘ testimony, Drs. Allen and Pollock would testify on the processes by which 
they discovered Quick possessed diminished executive functioning as a means of 
establishing a foundation for Dr. Self‘s testimony.55 If the Court admitted Dr. Self‘s 
 
 49.  Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *6–*7. 
 50.  Id. at *2–*3. 
 51.  Id. at *7. Texas law only requires for a manslaughter conviction that a person ―recklessly 
causes the death of an individual.‖ There is no intent requirement as there is for murder. TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 19.04(a). A person intends for an act to occur if the end result ―is his conscious objective 
or desire.‖ TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). Further, ―[a] person acts knowingly . . . with respect to a a 
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.‖ TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(b). 
 52.  Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *10. The three defense experts were Drs. Thomas Allen, 
Larry Pollock, and David Self. Id. 
 53.  Id. at *10–*12. Dr. Self, in his report on Quick for the expert witness hearing, defined 
executive functioning as a:  
set of cognitive abilities that control and regulate other abilities and behaviors. 
Executive functions are necessary for goal-oriented behavior. They include the ability to 
initiate and stop actions, to monitor and change behavior as needed, and to plan future 
behavior when faced with novel tasks and situations. Executive functions allow us to 
anticipate outcomes.  
Id. at *12. 
 54.  Id. at *10–*11; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 55.  Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *10–*11. Dr. Pollock submitted a report concluding that 
Quick‘s "neuropsychological evaluation revealed significant neurocognitive impairments. Deficits were 
found in . . . executive functioning, [including] visual tracking and speed of auditory processing, [which] 
. . . cause him to have problems in multitasking, planning and organization, and speed and flexibility of 
thinking." Id. at *11–*12. Dr. Allen‘s medical report similarly concluded that "[w]hile functioning 
within the normal limits of intelligence [Quick] is showing impairment in executive functioning and 
working memory. He can be easily confused, especially under stressful circumstances." Id. at *11.  
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testimony, he would testify that Quick‘s diminished executive functioning 
prevented him from forming the requisite intent for murder.56 
After reviewing the experts‘ reports, the trial court concluded that the experts 
failed to prove that Quick could not form the requisite intent for murder.57 The trial 
court held that the experts failed to adequately connect Quick‘s alleged diminished 
executive functioning to an inability to form the necessary mental state to commit 
murder, as required by the Texas evidentiary standard.58 The court found that Dr. 
Self‘s description of Quick‘s uncontrollable, confused mental state at the time of 
the murder did not meet the state‘s statutory definition of reckless because Dr. Self 
failed to demonstrate that Quick understood his actions and the consequences that 
would result, and knowingly and deliberately ignored this risk.59 The court also 
held that Dr. Self failed to prove whether Quick had any knowledge that his actions 
would cause his victim‘s death.60 The court ultimately concluded that the reports 
submitted by Quick‘s experts failed to demonstrate that Quick acted only recklessly 
and lacked the requisite mental state to commit murder.61 The court therefore 
overruled Quick‘s appeal on the issue of the trial court‘s abuse of discretion in 
rejecting the testimony of his neuroscience experts and affirmed the trial court‘s 
ruling convicting Quick of murder.62 
 
 56. Id. at *12. In arguing in his report that Quick could not form the requisite intent for murder, Dr. 
Self described Quick‘s ―already deficient executive brain function‖ as ―totally overwhelmed,‖ which 
caused him ―to act recklessly with a temporary inability to abort his course of action and chose [sic] 
from the available alternative courses appropriate to the situation.‖ Id. at *13.  
 57.  Id. at *12–*13 (―The expert reports fail to show that appellant did not act intentionally or 
knowingly, nor do they show that appellant acted recklessly.‖). The expert witness reports for this case 
are not yet publicly available, so information on how the experts evaluated the defendant and reached 
their conclusions can only be derived from the scant information contained in the Court‘s opinion. One 
can surmise on the experts‘ research processes based on the available information on how the doctors 
conduct their personal academic research. Dr. Larry Pollock, a neuropsychologist, typically evaluates his 
patients through neuropsychological evaluations, mental status examinations, and a general diagnostic 
battery. Welcome to Project ReEntry’s Website, PROJECT REENTRY, 
http://www.projectreentry.com/index.htm (last visited April 10, 2012). Dr. Pollock received his Ph.D. in 
clinical psychology from Syracuse University and has been practicing in his specialty of 
neuropsychiatry for thirty-five years. Company Info, PROJECT REENTRY, 
http://www.projectreentry.com/companyinfo.htm (last visited April 10, 2012). Dr. David Self, a 
neurobiologist at the University of Texas Southwestern. David Self, Ph.D., FACULTY PROFILE, SW. MED. 
CENTER, http://www.utsouthwestern.edu/findfac/research/0,2357,48661,00.html (last visited April 10, 
2012). Dr. Self received his Ph.D. in pharmacology from the University of California at Irvine and 
completed postdoctoral work at Yale University in the Division of Molecular Psychiatry. Id. His 
multiple awards and publications, including Daniel H. Efron Award by the American College of 
Neuropsychopharmacology, prove his competence in the field of neurobiology. Id.  
 58.   See Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *12–*14; see also supra notes 42–43 and 
accompanying text. 
 59.  Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *12–*14. 
 60.  Id. at *13. 
 61.  Id. at *13–*14 (finding that the expert reports failed to prove that Quick only acted recklessly 
and not with the knowing intention required for a murder conviction).  
 62.  Id. at *14. 
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B.  The Washington Approach to Neuropsychological Evidence 
1.  The Relevant Evidentiary Standards 
Washington Rules 702 and 704 on Testimony by Experts and Opinion on 
Ultimate Issue, respectively, are identical to Texas Rules 702 and 704.63 
Washington Rules 702 and 704 are relevant to an issue in United States v. Scott 
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony and the experts‘ proffered testimony 
on the ultimate issue of the defendant‘s requisite mental state.64 Washington 
follows the Frye rule for the admissibility of expert testimony;65 however, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington tried the case at 
bar,66 and as a result, the Court applied the Federal Rules of Evidence and the 
Daubert standard on expert testimony.67 Trial courts are not required to adhere to 
the Daubert factors in their entirety.68 As such, the Ninth Circuit, in United States 
v. Hankey, added its own factors to Daubert.69 According to the Ninth Circuit, in 
addition to the Daubert factors, a trial court may consider: 
Whether the opinion is based on scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge; [w]hether the expert‘s opinion would 
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or 
determining a fact in issue; [w]hether the expert has appropriate 
qualifications - i.e., some special knowledge, skill, experience, 
training or education on that subject matter; [w]hether the 
testimony is relevant and reliable; [w]hether the methodology or 
technique the expert uses ―fits‖ the conclusions; [and] [w]hether 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or undue consumption of 
time.70 
 
 
 63.  Compare WASH. R. EVID. 702 and 704, with TEXAS R. EVID. 702  and 704. The Washington 
rule, like the Texas rule, does not include part B of the Federal Rule on Opinion on Ultimate Issue. Id. 
 64.  U.S. v. Scott, No. CR-09-0131-EFS, 2011 WL 1327033, at *1 (E.D. Wash. April 7, 2011). 
 65.  See Reese v. Stroh, 128 Wash. 2d 300, 306–7 (1995) (favoring Frye‘s general acceptance test 
over the recently decided Daubert decision); see also Robert D. Leinbach, Novel Scientific Evidence 
After Reese v. Stroh: The Washington Supreme Court’s Love Affair With Frye, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1127, 
1127 (1996) (describing the firm holding of the Washington Supreme Court in Reese v. Stroh, that 
Washington courts should follow the Frye rule in determining whether to admit expert scientific 
evidence). 
 66.  Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *1.  
 67.  Id. at *2. The Court followed the federal Daubert standard rather than Washington‘s preferred 
Frye standard because under the Erie Doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply 
federal procedural law. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 68.  U.S. v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
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2.  Treatment of Expert Neuroscience Evidence in Scott 
On August 19, 2009, James Douglas Scott was admitted into the Veterans 
Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) for excessive alcohol consumption with blood 
alcohol content (BAC) of .38.71 Scott soon left his bed and refused Nurse 
Hoffman‘s attempts to escort him back to his room for IV treatment.72 In response, 
Scott head butted Nurse Hoffman in his chest.73 As Nurse Hoffman struggled to 
subdue Scott, Nurse Hoffman re-tore his rotator cuff.74 Later that evening, after 
returning to his bed, Scott attacked Nurse Best, forcefully grabbing his neck and 
kicking Nurse Best in his midsection.75 The nurses eventually restrained Scott by 
securing him to his bed with four-point restraints, under the orders of Scott‘s 
doctor.76 On January 21, 2011, Scott was found guilty in a Ninth Circuit Federal 
District Court of two counts of Assault by Inflicting Bodily Injury on Federal 
Employees.77 On April 7, 2011, the Court denied Scott‘s Motion for New Trial and 
Judgment of Acquittal.78 
At trial, Scott‘s attorneys argued a temporary insanity defense to negate his 
culpability for the alleged assault.79 As the crime of assault bars voluntarily 
intoxication as a defense, Scott sought to prove that his Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) from his years as an Army Ranger caused him to become 
involuntarily intoxicated on the night of the alleged incident.80 Scott argued that his 
involuntary intoxication rendered it impossible for him to formulate the requisite 
general intent for an assault conviction.81  
Scott sought to introduce three defense experts to prove his insanity theory.82 
Scott retained his first expert, Dr. Stanulis, to argue that patients suffering from 
 
 71.  Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *1.  
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id.   
 79.  Id. at *2. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure §12(2)(b) governs the requisite notice of expert 
testimony on the insanity defense. 18 U.S.C. § 17 governs the insanity defense to federal prosecution.  
 80.  Scott, 2011 WL 1327033,  at *2. Involuntary intoxication only occurs if the defendant is 
entirely unable ―to resist taking the first sip.‖ Id. at *5. In United States v. Vela,  the Ninth Circuit held 
that ―[V]oluntary intoxication is not a defense to a general intent crime‖ and that 18 U.S.C. ―§111 
[Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers or Employees] is a general intent crime.‖ 624 F.3d 
1148 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 81.  Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2. Symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder include 
―episodes of repeated reliving of the trauma in intrusive memories or ‗flashbacks‘ or dreams, which 
occur against the persisting background of a sense of ‗numbness‘ and emotional blunting, detachment 
from other people, unresponsiveness to surroundings, anhedonia, and avoidance of activities and 
situations reminiscent of the trauma.‖ STEPHEN JOSEPH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING POST-TRAUMATIC 
STRESS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PTSD AND TREATMENT 17 (1997).   
 82.  Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2. 
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PTSD will unintentionally self-medicate with alcohol to suppress the memory of 
their traumatic experience.83 Scott retained Dr. Julien to prove that an individual 
with a blood alcohol level as high as Scott‘s on the night of the alleged incident 
could not have formed the requisite intent to commit assault.84 Finally, Scott 
retained Dr. Brown to prove that his experience as an Army Ranger caused him to 
instinctively and involuntarily attack Nurses Hoffman and Best in reaction to his 
perception of the nurses as a threat to his safety.85 The trial court held three 
Daubert hearings on the admissibility of the experts‘ testimony and ultimately 
admitted testimony from Drs. Stanulis and Julien and denied testimony from Dr. 
Brown.86 
Prior to the Daubert evidentiary hearings, Dr. Stanulis provided the trial court 
with a detailed notice describing his potential testimony and containing his 
curriculum vitae.87 Dr. Stanulis‘s qualifications include his private medical practice 
where he specializes in clinical psychology and neuropsychology.88 Dr. Stanulis 
based his opinions in this case on his wide-ranging experience in the field, his 
personal interviews with Scott, and a thorough review of Scott‘s medical history.89 
While the court has not made Dr. Stanulis‘s report publicly available, Scott‘s 
counsel stated in a motion to the Court that Dr. Stanulis rendered his opinion 
through ―accepted methodologies and standards.‖90 The Court admitted Dr. 
Stanulis‘s testimony,91 over the Government‘s objections that he did not base his 
opinions on ―sufficient facts or data.‖92 
Dr. Mark Mays submitted a report regarding the effect of alcohol upon a 
patient suffering from PTSD.93 In his report, Dr. Mays explained that alcohol may 
have a greater effect on the executive functioning of a person with PTSD than on a 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Defendant‘s Memorandum in Response to Gov‘t‘s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and 
Testimony and to Determine the Admissibility of Expert Testimony at 2, 4, United States v. Scott, No. 
2.09-CR-00131-EFS (E.D.Wash. July 1, 2010). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 8 (―[Dr. Stanulis] has served in several prestigious academic and clinical positions as 
well as working in the Veterans Administration Medical Center in Allen Park, Michigan.‖).  
 90.  Id. at 11.  
 91.  Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2. 
 92.  Memorandum in Support Gov‘t‘s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and Testimony and 
for Evidentiary Hearing to Determine the Admissibility of Expert Testimony at 6–7, United States v. 
Scott, No. 2.09-CR-00131-EFS (E.D.Wash. June 24, 2010).  
 93.  Defendant‘s Memorandum in Response to Gov‘t‘s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and 
Testimony and to Determine the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, supra note 83, at 3. Dr. Mays did 
not meet with Scott, so his report reflects his knowledge and research in the field rather than a case study 
personalized to Scott‘s situation. Id. at 8. The defense did not proffer Dr. Mays as an expert in this case. 
Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2.  
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person not afflicted by this condition.94 Dr. Mays further submitted that this 
diminished executive functioning can lead to diminished self-control and 
comprehension, as well as an instinctually aggressive and excessive response to 
behavior perceived as invading the patient‘s personal space.95  
Dr. Julien submitted a report detailing his qualifications, his opinions on the 
case, and the medical basis for his opinions.96 Dr. Julien‘s qualifications include his 
M.S. and Ph.D. in Pharmacology and his medical degree.97 He has also published 
multiple editions of a textbook on psychopharmacology, frequently delivers 
lectures on the subject, and often serves as a court-qualified expert on the topic.98 
Dr. Julien testified in his affidavit that in addition to the excessive alcohol Scott 
consumed on the evening of the alleged incident and on the days preceding the 
alleged incident, Scott ingested prescribed benzodiazepine tranquilizers to relieve 
stress caused by his PTSD.99 The combination of the alcohol and the tranquilizer, 
according to Dr. Julien, prevented Scott from having any memory of the alleged 
assault, and this inability to form memory related to an inability to form intent, as 
both resulted from a diminished executive functioning.100 Dr. Julien concluded that 
―[i]t is clear here, to a degree of medical certainty, that (with no memory and a 
BAC of 0.38 grams% (and a BAC likely above 0.30 grams% three hours later) [sic] 
intentional actions cannot be formulated.‖101 Dr. Julien explained that Scott was in 
a state of ―organic dementia‖ where ―the ability to judge consequences of one‘s 
actions, and in essence the ability to act with any degree of executive or intellectual 
functioning is lost.‖102 The Court admitted the testimony of Dr. Julien,103 and 
overruled the State‘s objections that Dr. Julien did not base his opinions on 
―sufficient facts or data.‖104  
 
 94.  Affidavit of Mark Mays, PhD, JD at 6, United States v. Scott, No. 2.09-CR-00131-EFS 
(E.D.Wash. Feb. 10, 2010) (―[A]lcohol intoxication may result in an even more profound deterioration 
and impairment in functioning in a person with post traumatic stress disorder than with a more normally 
functioning individual.‖).  
 95.  Id. at 6–7 (―[T]here is both a likelihood of an excessive response due to PTSD, and the 
likelihood of a disinhibited and more unthinking and instinctual response, as might occur with alcohol 
intoxication.‖).  
 96.  Affidavit of Dr. Robert M. Julien, MD, PhD at 1–2, United States v. Scott, No. 2.09-CR-
00131-EFS (E.D.Wash Feb. 10, 2010). 
 97.  Id. at 1. 
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Id. at 1–2. Dr. Julien noted that the tranquilizers taken by Scott ―act in a manner identical to 
that of alcohol.‖ Id. at 2. 
 100.  Id. at 1–2. 
 101.  Id. at 2. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  United States v. Scott, No. CR-09-0131-EFS, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2 (E.D. Wash. April 7, 
2011). 
 104.  Memorandum in Support Gov‘t‘s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and Testimony and 
for Evidentiary Hearing to Determine the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, supra note 87, at 6.  
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Dr. Brown also submitted a report detailing his qualifications and opinions on 
the case.105 His qualifications included past expert testimony in criminal cases 
involving veterans; his background as a sociologist; his multiple publications in 
books and peer-reviewed journals on the Military Total Institution; and his military 
service during the Vietnam War.106 Moreover, Dr. Brown specializes in military 
training processes, the sociological effect of military training on the trainees, and 
the correlation between PTSD and the commission of criminal offenses.107 Dr. 
Brown interviewed Scott four times for an approximate total of fifteen hours, where 
he relied on more than one thousand pages of material on the transition of 
servicemen from the military to civilian life and that transition‘s impact on their 
future criminality.108 Dr. Brown concluded that Scott ―appears to have been 
reacting to a perceived threatening situation where he instantaneously reacted in a 
manner in which he had been trained in the military. His infantry training amplified 
by airborne and Ranger School training provided the means for an instant response 
to perceived threats.‖109 The State objected to Brown‘s testimony, arguing that his 
opinion on Scott‘s diminished capacity was not relevant to the requisite general 
intent for Scott‘s accused assault crime and that Dr. Brown did not base his 
conclusions on ―sufficient facts or data.‖110 The Court subsequently rejected 
Brown‘s testimony.111 
Although the Court admitted testimony from two of Scott‘s experts 
supporting his insanity defense, a jury still found Scott guilty of assault on both 
counts.112 On April 7, 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Edward F. Shea rejected 
Scott‘s Motion for New Trial and Judgment of Acquittal.113 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE VARIATION IN EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY UNDER DAUBERT 
A.  Comparison of the Quick and Scott Evidentiary Rulings 
In both Quick and Scott, the defendants sought to introduce testimony 
negating the requisite intent for their convictions resulting from their diminished 
 
 105.  Affidavit of William B. Brown, PhD, United States v. Scott, No. 2.09-CR-00131-EFS 
(E.D.Wash Feb. 9, 2010) (detailing his expert witness foundation).  
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. Dr. Brown describes the Military Total Institution as ―the sociological study of individuals 
who are recruited from a civilian culture and who are bureaucratically and systematically processed 
through the military institution, largely isolated from civilian contact and influences.‖ Id.  
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Gov‘t‘s Argument in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr. 
William Brown at 2–3, United States v. Scott, No. 2.09-CR-00131-EFS (E.D.Wash. Sept. 29, 2010). 
 111.  United States v. Scott, No. CR-09-0131-EFS, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2 (E.D. Wash. April 7, 
2011). 
 112.  Id. at *1. 
 113.  Id.  
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executive functioning.114 In Quick, the Texas trial court excluded Quick‘s expert 
neuroscience witnesses and the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s 
decision.115 By comparison, in Scott, the federal district court allowed testimony 
from two of the defendant‘s neuroscience experts, but rejected testimony from the 
third expert, whose testimony focused on sociological evidence rather than 
neuroscience evidence.116 Both Texas and the federal courts follow the Daubert 
standard, and both share an identical evidentiary rule for the admissibility of expert 
testimony under Texas Rule 702 and Federal Rule 702.117 Federal Rule 704 and 
Texas Rule 704 differ in that the federal rule explicitly prohibits experts from 
testifying on a defendant‘s mental capacity to commit a crime, while the Texas rule 
omits this point.118 Despite their similar evidentiary standards, the Texas trial court 
and the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Washington differed in their 
admissibility of neuroscience expert testimony in Quick and Scott.119 
The Texas Court in Quick rejected the neuroscience experts‘ testimony on the 
effect of the defendant‘s diminished executive functioning on his ability to form the 
requisite intent for murder because the Court found that the submitted experts‘ 
reports did not support the testimony they proffered.120 Dr. Allen determined that 
Quick‘s diminished executive functioning caused him to become ―easily 
confused‖.121 Dr. Pollock determined that Quick‘s executive functioning caused 
him to ―have problems in multitasking, planning and organization, and speed and 
flexibility of thinking;‖122 and Dr. Self determined that Quick‘s diminished 
executive functioning caused him to be ―momentarily unable to abort his course of 
action and chose [sic] from the available alternative courses appropriate to the 
situation.‖123 All of these factors would seem to indicate a neurological inability to 
form the requisite intent for murder, and yet the Court concluded that the proffered 
testimony did not support such a conclusion.124 The Court did not focus on any of 
the Daubert factors in reaching its conclusion, nor did it focus upon the reliability 
of the experts‘ testimony and the sufficiency of the techniques they used to reach 
 
 114.  See supra notes 49, 79–81 and accompanying text.   
 115.  See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.   
 116.  See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.   
 117.  See supra notes 17–25, 31–38 and accompanying text.   
 118.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Texas case law now allows testimony on a 
defendant‘s mental state. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 119.  See supra Part II.   
 120.  Quick v. State, No. 01-09-01127-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, *13–14 (Tex. App. Jan. 27, 
2011).  
 121.  Id. at *11. 
 122.  Id. at *11–12. 
 123.  Id. at *12.  
 124.  Id. at *13–14 (holding that the expert reports did not support the defendant‘s proffered 
neuropsychological defense).    
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their conclusions.125 Instead, the Court simply concluded that the experts, despite 
the depth and breadth of their academic experience in the field, did not support 
their argument that the defendant could not form the requisite intent to commit 
murder, without allowing the jury to draw its own inferences from the experts‘ 
conclusions.126  
In Scott, the Court admitted two of the defense‘s neuroscience experts, despite 
the prosecution‘s objections that the experts failed to base their opinions on 
―sufficient facts or data.‖127 Contrary to the prosecution‘s contentions, the defense‘s 
experts based their conclusions on the defendant‘s medical history and the experts‘ 
research in the field.128 Following three Daubert evidentiary hearings, the Court 
established ―clear parameters‖ as to the subjects on which two of the defense‘s 
three proffered experts could testify.129  
Two Daubert courts operating under similar evidentiary standards reached 
different rulings on testimony from highly credentialed experts seeking to prove 
that a defendant‘s diminished executive functioning prevented him from forming 
the requisite intent to commit a particular crime.130 Such disparate results reflect a 
complete lack of uniformity in Daubert‘s application.  
B.  The Judiciary’s Confusion Over Daubert’s Application 
The divergence in the approaches of the Texas and Federal District Courts on 
the admissibility of the expert testimony results from the problems that have 
stemmed from the Court‘s ruling in Daubert. Daubert created confusion for the 
courts in determining whether to admit expert scientific testimony.131 Some 
attribute this confusion to the flexible nature of the Daubert factors in their 
allowing judges the option of following either one or all of the factors.132 Because 
of Daubert‘s malleability, judges do not apply the Daubert factors uniformly.133 
The lack of uniformity in the application of Daubert has led to unpredictability in 
 
 125.  See id. 
 126.  Id.; see also supra note 57.  
 127.  United States v. Scott, No. CR-09-0131-EFS, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2 (E.D. Wash. April 7, 
2011); see also supra notes 91–92, 103–104 and accompanying text. 
 128.  See supra notes 87–90, 96–98, 105–108 and accompanying text. 
 129.  Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2–3.  
 130.  See supra Part II.   
 131.  Cassandra H. Welch, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert's Legacy of Confusion, 
29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1085, 1094–95 (1995) (describing the ―fundamental tension on 
admissibility‖ created by the Daubert decision).  
 132.  Id. (noting the irony of the inconsistent ruling as a result of Daubert when the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to Daubert in order to remedy perceived inconsistencies).   
 133.  Id. at 1096 (concluding that the courts‘ varying approaches to Daubert is ―in line with the 
‗liberal thrust‘ of the Federal Rules‖).  
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the courts‘ interpretation of its factors because the courts lack comprehensive, 
mandatory requirements.134   
Daubert grants a high level of deference to the judges in determining when to 
admit expert testimony, which has given judges the freedom to follow Daubert in a 
manner of their choosing and has contributed to the disparate treatment of 
neuroscience evidence among the courts.135 An independent study of four hundred 
randomly selected state court judges reflects the variance in judges‘ approaches to 
Daubert.136 The study sought to measure the disparities in courts‘ interpretations of 
Daubert by polling the judges on their perception of Daubert‘s role and intended 
application.137 The study found that thirty-two percent of the responding judges 
believed that Daubert raised the standards for the admissibility of expert testimony, 
while twenty-three percent believed that Daubert lowered admissibility 
standards.138 Thirty-six percent of the responding judges believed that Daubert did 
not change the standard for admissibility, and the remaining eleven percent had not 
yet determined Daubert‘s impact.139 The survey also found ―little consensus‖ in the 
manner in which the judges balanced and combined the Daubert factors.140 The 
survey demonstrates the confusion Daubert has generated among judges;141 with 
such documented variation in the perceptions of judges, the divergence in the 
approaches of the Texas and federal district courts in Quick and Scott seems to 
naturally comport with the national trend.142 
Daubert‘s deference to judges in admitting expert testimony requires the 
judges to have a comprehension of complex scientific data that may exceed their 
capabilities.143 Forcing judges to navigate through complicated, unfamiliar 
neurological data to determine admissibility only compounds the variation in the 
application of Daubert because many judges have no background or formal training 
 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id. (describing the ―highly deferential standard of review . . . and the courts‘ application of 
varying standards and tests‖). 
 136.  Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging 
Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 443 (2001).   
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 453. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  More than five years after the Supreme Court decided Daubert, forty percent of Texas judges 
admitted to not having read this pivotal decision, which may also contribute to their confusion over 
Daubert’s role. Cynthia S. Kent, Daubert Readiness of Texas Judiciary: A Study of the Qualifications, 
Experience, and Capacity of the Members of the Texas Judiciary to Determine the Admissibility of 
Expert Testimony under the Daubert, Kelly, Robinson, and Havner Tests, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 
16, 18 (1999). 
 143.  Welch, supra note 131, at 1096 (―Daubert requires judges to have scientific knowledge and to 
apply that knowledge to the facts of each case.‖).  
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in the field.144 Lay judges‘ inexperience with scientific information thwarts their 
ability to accurately evaluate proffered testimony for Daubert compliance.145 Many 
judges avoid science because they do not understand science, which may have 
negative implications for attorneys‘ attempts at introducing neuroscience 
evidence.146 
The neuroscience evidence in Quick and Scott succumbed to the whims of the 
gatekeeper judges to determine admissibility. Despite the similarities between the 
neuroscience evidence from the two cases, what the evidence sought to prove, and 
the respective evidentiary standards for admissibility, the Texas trial court excluded 
neuropsychological testimony and the federal district court admitted neuroscience 
testimony on the intent issue, although the juries ultimately found both defendants 
guilty.147 Daubert granted judges flexibility in their admissibility of expert 
testimony;148 the contrasting approaches of the Texas and Federal District Courts 
reflect this judicial deference and the diverging opinions generated as a result.149  
 
 
 
 144.  See Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific 
Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 716–17 (1993) (analogizing judges‘ and lawyers‘ discomfort with 
science to ―a child about to get a tetanus shot. They know it‘s painful and believe it‘s necessary, but 
haven‘t the foggiest idea how or why it works‖). 
 145.  Gatowski et al., supra note 132, at 452–54.   
 146.  See Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific 
Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 58 (1998) (postulating that ―courts continue to evade the science issues‖ 
and that ―judges are turning a blind eye to the science involved in the evidence before them‖). 
Moreover, applying novel neuroscience principles to traditional common law offenses that long predated 
the scientific advancements poses challenges to judges when evaluating the admissibility of evidence. 
See Brent Garland & Paul W. Glimcher, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Law, 16 CURRENT OPINIONS 
NEUROBIOLOGY 130, 130 (2006) (―These physiological insights will challenge, in turn, legal systems 
that rest on conceptual bases that are often hundreds of years old.‖). These challenges result, in part, 
from the innate differences between science and the law. Id. at 131. Science relies on a more meticulous, 
longer process of truth seeking that may span decades before reaching a definitive answer, whereas the 
law demands immediate answers and cannot afford to wait for the testing of every possible variable. See 
id. (explaining that ―the rules of evidence do not require perfection — only relevance‖). Additionally, 
the litigation system requires definitive answers and denies experts the opportunity to expound upon 
potential uncertainties and caveats to their theories. Joseph Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1559–1560 (2007) (quoting MARK A. CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN 
COURT: MOBILIZING EXPERTS IN THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES 115 (1988)). One expert witness 
in a school desegregation case commented that ―[I]t is not the role of the witness to define the case, to 
call attention to everything that could possibly be said about a subject . . . I guess I accepted the idea that 
I am serving one side and that resolved potential conflicts.‖ Id. at 1560.  
 147.  See supra Part II.  
 148.  See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text.  
 149.  Cf. Judith A. Hasko, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Flexible Judicial 
Screening of Scientific Expert Evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 479, 
495 (1995) (describing the Daubert decision as a ―[departure] from the Court‘s general trend toward 
plain meaning jurisprudence‖).  
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Neuroscience evidence has not yet reached the point where courts can admit 
expert testimony carte blanche, but as a result of Daubert‘s flexible standards, 
courts in different districts do not treat similar evidence uniformly.150 As Quick v. 
State and United States v. Scott illustrate, two courts applying similar evidentiary 
standards to neuropsychological evidence of intent to commit a crime may regard 
the evidence unequally.151 As neuroscience evidence advances to the point where it 
may one day transform criminal litigation, the law should advance along with it by 
adhering to a definitive set of evidentiary standards beyond the flexible Daubert 
factors in order to restore predictability and fairness to the process of evidence 
admissibility. 
 
 
 150.  See Rosen, supra note 4 (suggesting that neuroscience evidence is not yet ripe enough to 
―identify the mysterious point at which people should be excused from responsibility for their actions 
because they are not able, in some sense, to control themselves,‖ but that the emerging field of neurolaw 
is continuously advancing).  
 151.  See supra Part II. 
